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ABSTRACT
Over the past century, China has been depicted as being solely to blame for the world’s most serious
commercial piracy problem. But this characterization is not entirely China’s fault. Multinational
corporations and international brand owners in China have adopted a flawed approach to combating
trademark infringement that is actually making the problem worse within Chinese walls.
Companies and brand owners have primarily implemented one dimensional, enforcement only
approaches that rely specifically on litigation as a means to curb counterfeiting and trademark
infringement. Since 2001, China has made substantial strides in the laws governing trademarks
and has trended toward positive treatment of international brand owners in its civil courts.
However, judicial enforcement is still plagued by a plethora of issues, including lack of judicial
independence, difficulty in enforcing judgments, and inadequacy of penalties, rendering an
enforcement only approach to be virtually futile. This comment addresses how the current reliance
on litigation as a trademark enforcement strategy and means to curb counterfeiting by corporations
and brand owners is wholly ineffective. Additionally, this comment proposes alternative and
preventative strategies, which may prove useful for international companies and brand owners in
protecting their trademarks from infringement and from counterfeiting in China.
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YOU SAY, “普拉达” I SAY, “COUNTERFEIT”: THE PERILS OF CIVIL
LITIGATION AS A TRADEMARK PROTECTION STRATEGY IN CHINA
TRICIA M. BRAUER*
INTRODUCTION
On vacation, most people choose to bask on beaches of Rio, conquer the slopes of
Switzerland, or scale the sacred stairs of Machu Picchu. However, some people
vacation solely to hear “Hey pretty lady, you want Louis Vuitton…Coach…Prada?”
This is the siren’s song of counterfeiters everywhere. The Silk Market in Beijing.
Luohu Commercial City in Shenzhen. Fengshine Plaza in Shanghai. Something all
these places have in common is that guidebooks and tourists alike consider them
vacation hotspots to purchase counterfeit copies of famous brands, like MAC, Apple,
and Burberry. Over the past decade, these retail hubs of counterfeit goods have
survived and thrived despite the combined efforts of the Chinese government, multinational corporations, brand owners, and the lawyers that represent them.1 Today,
China remains the single largest producer of counterfeit goods in the world.2
The People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “China”) is commonly depicted as
being solely to blame for having the world’s most serious commercial piracy problem.3
However, China is not the lone proprietor.4 Multi-national corporations, brand
owners, and the lawyers that represent them have adopted a flawed approach to
combating trademark infringement, including counterfeiting in China, that is
actually making the problem worse by “inciting a frenzy of counterfeiting at all-time
new world highs.”5 Many companies and brand owners in China have adopted a onedimensional approach that relies solely on enforcement, specifically litigation, as a
* © Tricia M. Brauer 2012.
Tricia M. Brauer is a 2013 Joint J.D./LL.M. candidate in
Intellectual Property Law at The John Marshall Law School.
She received a B.A. in
Sociology/Anthropology, International Studies & Sino-U.S. Business Relations from Denison
University in 2010. She would like to thank her husband, Matt Larimore, her parents, sister and
family for their infinite support, love and patience. She would also like to thank her editors Felisa
Leisinger, Amanda Booth-Neidhardt, and Nicole Chaney for their extensive review, encouragement
and contributions to this comment. Any mistakes in this article are her own.
1 See generally David Kravets, U.S. Signs International Anti-Piracy Accord, WIRED.COM (Oct.
3, 2011, 3:35 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/united-states-signs-acta/ (implying
that China’s lack of participation in revolutionary global intellectual property rights (“IPR”)
protection treaties like the ACTA, gives the general impression that China, while interested in
facially protecting IPR, is not interested in the actual practice).
2 Dalila Hoover, Coercion Will Not Protect Trademark Owners in China but an Understanding
of China’s Culture Will: A Lesson the United States Has to Learn, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
325, 325 (2011); U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: FISCAL
YEAR OF 2011 SEIZURE STATISTICS 15 (January 6, 2012), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/priority_trade/ipr/ipr_communications/seizure/ipr_seizur
es_fy2011.ctt/ipr_seizure_fy2011.pdf (“China remains the primary source country for counterfeit and
pirated goods.”).
3 Daniel C.K. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies in China:
How a Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. REV. 749, 750 (2010).
4 Id.
5 Id.
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Although these
means to curb counterfeiting and trademark infringement.6
companies and brand owners have had significant success in utilizing litigation in
Chinese courts as a vehicle to protect their intellectual property rights (“IPR”) and
assets, an “enforcement only” approach is overly legalistic, reactionary, and,
ultimately, not very effective.7
This comment discusses how an enforcement-only approach, specifically focused
on litigation, is an ineffective strategy to protect trademarks and curb counterfeiting
in China. Part One provides a foundation for understanding counterfeiting laws,
trademark laws, and enforcement schemes in China. Part Two analyzes why
litigation is an ineffective trademark protection strategy despite the bevy of recent
decisions by Chinese courts favoring brand owners. Part Three proposes alternative
trademark enforcement and protection strategies to litigation, taking into account
the cultural, historical, and legal perspectives of trademark law in China.
I. BACKGROUND
This section contextualizes why an enforcement only trademark protection
strategy in China is ineffective. The harm created to brands by counterfeiting and
trademark infringement is not mitigated by an enforcement only approach.
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze counterfeiting and Chinese trademark law
within its cultural, historical, and legal perspectives to advance an effective
protection and enforcement strategy.
A. Counterfeiting in China
Counterfeiting is defined as the “unauthorized act by one party of producing and
passing off exact duplicates of authentic products with trademarks owned by another
party.”8 In the past two decades, counterfeit goods, or “knockoffs,” have flooded the
international market.9 Today, knockoffs of brand products exist in almost every
category of goods, including food, alcohol, cell phones, hair care products, medicine,

Id.
See generally TRADEMARK OFFICE/ TRADEMARK REVIEW & ADJUDICATION BD. OF STATE
ADMIN. FOR INDUS. & COMMERCE, ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT ON CHINA’S TRADEMARK
STRATEGY 2010, available at
http://www.saic.gov.cn/sbjenglish/tz_1/201105/P020110513398780192223.pdf (illustrating
trademark enforcement strategies and schemes, including judicial trademark enforcement, between
1999 and 2008).
8 Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 9
(2000) (stating that there are no specific definitions of counterfeiting under Chinese law, but a
number of different legal provisions that refer generally to trademark infringement and broadly
encompass counterfeiting).
9 Chow, supra note 3, at 753 n.10; see generally Sinking the Copyright Pirates:
Global
Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 1
(2009) (statement of Timothy P. Trainer, President, Global Intellectual Property Strategy Center,
P.C.) (encouraging government and the industry to conduct stronger and better IP enforcement
actions against infringers).
6
7
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and heavy machinery.10 Advances in technology and production techniques have
made imitations perilously indistinguishable from the real thing, making it more
difficult than ever before for the buyer and perhaps even the brand owner, to
determine the authenticity of a particular item.11
International companies are unable to compete with high quality cheap black
market products and lose revenue as a result.12 China, for example, sells billions of
dollars in counterfeit goods every year to local consumers, tourists, and over the
internet.13 This effect of counterfeiting is felt on a global scale.14 It is estimated that
five to seven percent of worldwide trade is counterfeit.15 This in turn is “estimated to
cost American industries alone between $200 billion to $290 billion.”16 Furthermore,
brands are simultaneously threatened with losing exclusivity in the eyes of
consumers.17
There is a high probability that individuals might lose interest in the legitimate
versions of luxury items if they believe availability on the black market makes the
good less exclusive.18 This may also occur if the consumer is confused by a poor
quality counterfeit and believes the brand’s quality is declining.19 Loss of demand
results in the decline of a particular item’s market price, which results in an
“additional burden for the economically imperiled brand.”20 The brand will then
incur greater costs to curb counterfeiting even though sales and market shares are
already lost to the black market.21
The origin of China’s counterfeiting problem can be attributed to China’s
unprecedented economic development, simultaneous with the rise of consumer
wealth and spending power, the development of well-known brands, and a
commercial advertising industry.22
Additional contributing factors include
10 NAIM MOISES, ILLICIT: HOW SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 118 (2005).
11 David M. Hopkins et al., Imitating Property is Theft, THE ECONOMIST, May 15, 2003,
http://www.economist.com/node/1780818; see also Chow, supra note 8, at 10 (explaining that
counterfeit products are often indistinguishable from the genuine product and will often bear the
registered or unregistered trademark of another party along with the company name, address, and
trade dress of the lawful manufacturer or trademark owner).
12 See Chow, supra note 8, at 10.
13 Bob Orr, Counterfeit Goods from China a Continuing Problem that Costs Billions a Year,
NEWS
(May
11,
2012,
7:04
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162CBS
57433030/counterfeit-goods-from-china-a-continuing-problem-that-costs-billions-a-year/.
14 Chow, supra note 3, at 753 (reporting the United States, Japan, and the European Union
reported over 80,000 seizures of shipments of counterfeit and infringing goods by customs
authorities in recent years, resulting in worldwide losses of $650 billion).
15 About Counterfeiting, INT’L ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COALITION, http://www.iacc.org/aboutcounterfeiting/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2012).
16 Ellie Mercado, As Long as “It” is Not Counterfeit:
Holding eBay Liable for Secondary
Trademark Infringement in the Wake of LVMH and Tiffany Inc., 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 115,
135 (2010).
17 Id.
18 Id. (illustrating that in certain instances, the consumer is aware that the goods purchased
are counterfeit especially when dealing with clothing, shoes, and handbags).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
22 Id. (alluding that unprecedented economic development, combined with the rise of consumer
wealth and spending power, helped create and solidify the market for luxury goods); Stanley B.
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unemployment caused by reforms in the state sector and the Asian economic crisis.23
Contextually, the counterfeiting problem in China is not uncommon. All economies
at some point have encountered counterfeiting problems during some stage of
development.24 However, the magnitude of China’s counterfeiting problem is
unprecedented in world history.25
B. Trademarks in China
1. Cultural Context of Trademarks
The notion of trademark rights is relatively new in China.26 Despite being a
creative and inventive society in many disciplines for thousands of years, IPR have
been surprisingly absent from China’s history.27 Until 2001, “the protection of
trademarks and intellectual property was not a primary concern for the Chinese
government.”28 As such, trademark laws were not created based on demand from the
Chinese people to protect their rights.29 Instead, they were “triggered by constant
pressure from the United States to protect the intellectual property rights of brand
owners and multi-national corporations trying to do business in China.”30

Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China After Deng Xiaoping: “Mao and Meditation” Revisited, 11
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 229, 241 n.32 (1997) (summarizing China’s economic growth at nine percent per
annum).
23 Joseph Kahn & Craig S. Smith, Unemployment Boosts Tensions in China—In the Cities, Idle
Workers Vie with Rural Newcomers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1995, at A8 (stating that state enterprise
reform is one cause of soaring unemployment, thus creating the need for individuals to create
personal revenue through alternative means, i.e. the black market).
24 Chow, supra note 8, at 9 (stating that the counterfeiter—who has no investment costs—
essentially engages in theft by benefiting from the brand's goodwill by the unauthorized use of the
trademark); see also Chow, supra note 3, at 752–53 (illustrating that the issue of counterfeiting first
surfaced in the late 1990s as China’s economy began to absorb large amounts of foreign investment,
capital, and technology, which allowed China to misappropriate technology).
25 Anne M. Wall, Intellectual Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights, 17
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 341, 342 (2006); see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008
SPECIAL 301 REPORT, 19 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf (illustrating the United
States’ constant frustration with China’s inability to protect IPR specifically by putting China on the
Priority Foreign Country Watch List for epidemic infringements of IPR for consecutive years from
2005 to 2010); Hoover, supra note 2, at 326 (explaining that China continues to be the most
notorious and singled-out country for piracy and counterfeiting practices).
26 Robert H. Hu, International Legal Protection of Trademarks in China, 13 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 69, 72–73 (2009); see Hoover, supra note 2, at 343–44.
27 DEIXIN TIAN, THE CHINESE CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS OF INNOVATION, FAIR USE, AND THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: A GRASS-ROOTS APPROACH TO STUDYING THE U.S.-CHINA COPYRIGHT DISPUTES 17
(Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bowling Green State University).
28 Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon is Over:
The U.S. China WTO Intellectual Property
Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 103 (2009).
29 Jennifer A. Crane, Riding the Tiger: A Comparison of Intellectual Property Rights in the
United States and the People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 95, 96 (2008).
30 Hoover, supra note 2, at 343.
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Under Chinese imperial rule, emperors used Confucian values to “legitimize
their governmental regime and their own authority.”31 Confucianism acted as an
ethical code and served as a template for the behavior of the Chinese people for
thousands of years.32 Confucian ideology focused primarily on the passing down of
intellectual works for others to build and improve upon and “strongly encouraged
imitation of teachers as a way of learning, loyalty to masters, and subordination of
individual interests to the social good.”33 These beliefs culminated in the ultimate
state ideology: the peoples’ interest is first.34 The family was considered the social
and political community and legal obligations stemmed from that relationship.35
Comparatively, Western laws and customs regulated social and economic rights of
the individual.36 Therefore, individualistic concepts like IPR and private ownership
remain to a certain extent, contrary to the Chinese way of life.37
Up until the late 1980s, China and its people did not view IPR violations as
“taking away” of one’s individual rights.38 Sharing, copying and infringing conduct
was highly valued and considered perfectly acceptable.39 This school of thought was
firmly engrained in the Chinese people during the Maoist era, when the Communist
party coined the collectivist mentality: “What was good for the group was good for
the individual.”40 Therefore, external laws were rarely used and were disapproved of
by society as a mode of governance.41 Based on Confucian “ideals, external laws were
mostly used where self regulation failed to provide an adequate remedy.”42
Accordingly, most Chinese people viewed lawsuits as bad luck, or even evil.43

31 Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia:
From the Legal Culture
Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 13, 9 (2000) (illustrating how Confucianism served as a
guide for Chinese peoples’ behavior from the sixth century B.C. to the middle of the twentieth
century).
32 Dali Yang, The Development of Intellectual Property in China, 25 WORLD PAT. INFO. 131, 134
(2003).
33 Brian Fitzgerald & Lucy Montgomery, Copyright and the Creative Industries in China, 9
INT’L J. CULTURAL STUD. 407, 408 (2006); see also TIAN, supra note 27, at 50 (supporting the
proposition that Confucianism strongly encouraged the imitation of teachers as a way of learning).
34 Hoover, supra note 2, at 344.
35 Peng, supra note 31, at 12.
36 Id.
37 Angela Mia Bean, Piracy of American Intellectual Property in China, 4 J. INT’L L. & PRAC.
335, 339 (1995).
38 Hoover, supra note 2, at 344.
39 Id.
40 TIAN, supra note 27, at 50–51; see also Hoover, supra note 2, at 344 (“[W]ork products were
collectively owned by the state for the good of society.”). What was good for the group was
considered equally as beneficial for the individual. Id. As such, individuals would regulate
themselves and others within the community. Id. This mode of self-governance helped to regulate
morality and propriety in China. Id.
41 See Hoover, supra note 2, at 345.
42 Id. at 344.
43 Id. at 345 (explaining that public apologies are often mandated by Chinese courts in many
actions for trademark infringement because the public acknowledgments of a wrong will “create
such an embarrassment that it will serve as a future deterrent”).
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2. Historical Context of Trademarks
The first trademark law in China was issued in 1963.44 However, the law did
not provide trademark ownership rights.45 It merely ensured Government control
over the “manufacturing units by requiring the quality of a product to coincide with
the trademark registration.”46 In 1982, the 1963 law was amended in order to
“improve management of trademarks, to protect exclusive rights of trademark
owners and to encourage manufacturers to guarantee the quality of their goods and
maintain the reputation of their trademarks.”47 Enforcement of the 1982 law was
often ineffective because China had tolerated lax enforcement of its trademark laws
“under the belief that it was in the national interest and Chinese consumers
benefited.”48
The law was again amended in 1993 and shifted its focus to provide trademark
owners actual rights in their marks.49 It was amended primarily for two reasons.
First, China wanted to be more active in international trade.50 Second, the United
States forced China to enter into agreements that provided stronger trademark
protection under “threat of the imposition of costly trade sanctions.”51 However,
despite these efforts, China's trademark law did not coincide with United States law
or international treaties.52

44 Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law in China: Basic Policy and New Developments, 4
ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 5 (1997).; see also Alisa Cahan, China’s Protection of Famous and
Well-Known Marks: The Impact of China’s Latest Trademark Law Reform on Infringement and
Remedies, 12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 224 (2004) (noting that China’s first trademark law,
promulgated in 1963, did not provide ownership rights).
45 See Zhang, supra note 44, at 5–6.
46 CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA Dec. 4, 1982, available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (demonstrating that this version of
the Constitution is still valid despite amendments in 1988 and 1993).
47 Cahan, supra note 44, at 224; see also Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China,
(promulgated by the Standing comm. Fifth Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective March 1,
1983), translated in CHINA L. FOREIGN BUS. 11 (P.R.C) [hereinafter Trademark Law P.R.C. 1982]
(explaining generally the reasoning behind the 1983 amendments); PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN CHINA 296 (2d ed. 2003) (illustrating that the Trademark Office (“TMO”) was given the
task of “recentralizing trademark registration” and the Trademark Review Board (“TRB”) was given
“exclusive jurisdiction to review and adjudicate inter alia all disputes over the validity of
registration”).
48 Rory J, Radding, Enforcement of the Trademark Law in China, 11 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 5, 7
(1998) (explaining that lax trademark enforcement provided China with “cheap access to goods and
expensive technology . . . enhanced the nation's foreign exchange posture by lessening the drain of
foreign intellectual property royalties and repatriation of profits, promoted domestic employment in
the piracy industry and enhanced export revenues via pirated goods”).
49 Implementation Regulations for the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China,
translated in CHINA L. FOREIGN BUS., 11-510 (July 28, 1993).
50 Cahan, supra note 44, at 224.
51 FENG, supra note 47, at 296–97 (noting that the United States used “Special 301” provisions
to designate China as a priority foreign country and whether or not it protected intellectual property
rights).
52 See generally id. at 296–99 (alluding to the fact that China’s trademark law failed to comply
with TRIPS, barring China’s entrance into the WTO and limiting China’s opportunities to trade
with the United States).
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3. International Compliance and Current Trademark Law
By the late 1990s it was clear that China’s negotiations with the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) would require a third revision of the Chinese trademark law to
comply with the Agreement of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)
standards and obligations.53 After some debate, the revisions were adopted on
October 27, 2001 and became effective that December.54 The 2001 Chinese
Trademark Law conforms more closely with international practice standards, and
has made several notable changes.55
Under China’s previous trademark law, “applicants for trademark registration
were limited to enterprise and institutional units and ICHs.”56 Article 96 of the
General Principles of Civil Code 1986 extended “trademark proprietorship to ‘legal
persons, ICHs and individual partnerships.’”57 However, the 1993 revision ignored
this extension. China’s 2001 revision allows natural persons as well as legal persons
and other organizations to apply for registration.58
Additionally, the 2001 revision instituted judicial review of all TRB decisions
including those concerning the validity of trademark registration.59 Initially, the
State Administration for Industry & Commerce (“SAIC”) opposed the wide scope of
discretion given the judiciary.60 However, the SAIC was eventually forced to
acquiesce by Chinese courts.61 With SAIC opposition out of the way, the Chinese
courts were able to play a larger role in protecting and enforcing trademarks.62

Dong Baolin, Thoughts on the Second Revision of the Trademark Law, CPT 2, 38–40 (1999).
Id.
55 Compare GORDON C.K. CHEUNG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA: POLITICS OF
PIRACY, TRADE AND PROTECTION 87–88 (2009) (discussing the trademark regime in China), with
2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 25, at 19 (noting that although China has made “welcome
progress” in many of the areas of IPR enforcement, it still remains a top IP enforcement and TRIPS
compliance priority for the United States).
56 Trademark Law P.R.C. 1982, supra note 47 (stating that individual citizens could not apply
for registration).
57 FENG, supra note 47, at 299.
58 Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Fifth Nat’l People’s Cong. Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001, translated by China IPR Law,
available at http://www.giprs.org/node/20 [hereinafter Trademark Law P.R.C. 2001] (stating that the
2001 trademark laws were designed to accept all “visually perceptible signs” to be trademarks,
including charters, designs, letters, numerals, three-dimensional signs, combinations of colors as
well as any combination thereof, adding provisions and directives to make infringement more clear).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. (stating that the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) brushed off the Trademark Review
Board’s (“TRB”) assumed exclusive jurisdiction over trademark ownership disputes and holding that
a TRB decision on the registration of a mark was final only with regard to any direct challenge to
the registration).
62 Improvements for Chinese Patent and Other IP Protections, CHINA COM. L. FIRM (Jan. 20,
2011, 11:21 AM), http://www.chinalawfirms.cn/practice-areas/intellectual-property/ip-protection/801improvements-for-chinese-patent-and-other-ip-protections.html.
53
54
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II. ANALYSIS
In the field of intellectual property, China has come a long way in a very short
period of time.63 In the past twenty years, China has experienced an unprecedented
transformation of its legal system to protect trademarks.64 In order to respond to the
rapid economic growth that has attracted foreign businesses and pressure from the
global economy, China took major steps to provide this protection.65 First, China
modernized its economy by embracing Western market-based principles.66 Second,
China launched major economic reforms that have overhauled its legal system,
including intellectual property law.67 Most importantly however, China has made
reforms to its judicial system to provide a means of enforcement by engaging its
courts actively in enforcing trademark laws68 and adjudicating trademark and other
IPR disputes.69
One of the major changes made by the 2001 Amendment to the PRC Trademark
Law was the transfer of final review of decisions to the Trademark Review and
Adjudication Board from the administrative branch to the judicial departments.70 As
a reflection of the court’s new role, new systems of judicial oversight began to
emerge.71 In order to comply with TRIPS, as cited within the 2001 Amended
Trademark Law, administrative orders were no longer final but may receive judicial
review.72 This type of jurisdictional overlap often results in “the hoarding of
oversight and power” not simply relegated to the relationship between the
administrative departments and the judiciary.73 However, this does not take away
from the fact that allowing the judiciary final review of administrative decisions is a
step of epic proportions for intellectual property rights in China.74
In 1993, to accommodate for the expansive undertaking of final judicial review,
the Intellectual Property Rights Tribunal became the first Chinese court to
adjudicate intellectual property issues.75 Despite the fact that both business and
Id.
Cheung, supra note 55, at 87.
65 Hu, supra note 26, at 76 .
66 John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Towards Property Rights
in Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 735, 786–87 (1999).
67 Scott A. McKenzie, Global Protection of Trademark Intellectual Property Rights:
A
Comparison of Infringement and Remedies Available in China Versus the European Union, 34 GONZ.
L. REV. 529, 531 (1998).
68 Id. at 552–53.
69 Hu, supra note 26, at 76.
70 WTO Accession: Trademark Law Amended to Better Protect Famous Brands, HONG KONG
TRADE DEV. COUNCIL (Nov. 15, 2001), http://info.hktdc.com/alert/cba-e0111d.htm.
71 Id.
72 See Trademark Law P.R.C. 2001, supra note 58.
73 Breann M. Hill, Achieving Protection of the Well-Known Mark in China: Is There a Lasting
Solution?, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 281, 296 (2009).
74 Id.
75 Jessica Jiong Zhou, Trademark Law & Enforcement in China: A Transnational Perspective,
20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 415, 431 (2002) (stating the proposition that the Intellectual Property Rights
Tribunal was created by the Beijing Intermediate People’s court and was the first to be devoted
solely to intellectual property.); see also Jessica C. Wong, The Challenges Multinational
Corporations Face in Protecting Their Well-Known Trademarks in China, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937,
968 (2006) (illustrating that similar intellectual property courts have been established in Shanghai,
63
64
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legal commentators alike often question the independence of the Chinese judiciary76,
the creation and implementation of intellectual property rights tribunals throughout
China is an indication that the government recognized the need for the guidance of a
highly specialized court for the intellectual property community.77 Additionally in
1993, China opened the China Intellectual Property Training Center (“CIPTC”) in
order to train government officials of all levels, including judges, who have minimal
experience in mitigating intellectual property disputes.78 The formalized training for
intellectual property officials and increased funding from the government created a
specialized judiciary, which administers a stronger form of enforcement than it once,
did.79 The best proof of this is the increasing number of judicial victories for
international brand owners trying to conduct business in China.80
Tianjin, Guangzhou, Fujian Province, Jiansu Province, Hainan Province, and the Special Economic
Zones).
76 George O. White III, Enter the Dragon: Foreign Direct Investment Laws and Policies in the
P.R.C., 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 35, 35 (2003).
77 See Courts of Appeals, U.S.
CTS,http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/CourtofAppeals.aspx
(last visited Dec. 29, 2012) (illustrating that the U.S. Court of Appeals has the power to preside over
patent cases, which is similar to the Chinese intellectual property tribunals’ power to hear
particularized IP subject matter).
78 Li Yuguang, Deputy Comm’r for the State Intellectual Prop. Office of the People’s Republic of
China, Address at the University of Dayton Rio Symposium: The Current Situation and the
Challenges of IP Training in China (Mar. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/academy/en/ipacademies/rio_symposium/presentation_dr_li.pd
f (illustrating that The John Marshall Law School is part of the International Cooperation
component of CIPTC, educating Chinese nationals and practitioners on the importance of
intellectual property protection through the J.D. and LL.M programs).
79 Andrew Evans, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS and Chinese Amendments
to Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 587, 588 (2003) (establishing that the new
specialized judiciary has more funds and technical training allocated to it for intellectual property
protection and enforcement than state administrative agencies).
80 CIELA Summary Report: Trend by Year, CHINA IP LITIG. ANALYSIS,
http://www.ciela.cn/Search/TrendByYearResult.aspx?pageId=1&ppId=2&language=en&city=&court
=&mainType=Trade+Mark&subType=&cause=Infringement&industry (last visited Dec. 28, 2012)
(illustrating the trends in trademark litigation in Chinese courts from 2006–2009).
Year

2009

CIELA Summary Report: Trend By Year (Trademark Infringement)
Average
Average
Ratio
Total
Outcome
Damages

Damages

Number of

Claim

Awarded

Judgments

260,320

69,287

WPL

Average
Costs
Claimed

27%

219

53%/37%/10%

$9953

32%

266

25%/62%/13%

$13,032

29%

301

11%/76%/13%

$11673

29%

346

&%/76%/17%

$11673

(121)
2008

276.260

88,670
(147

2007

452,917

132,007
(157)

2006

481,993

139,129
(205)
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In the past ten years under these new reforms inspired by TRIPS and 2001
Amendments to the Trademark Law, major brand owners have been increasingly
successful in litigating disputes in Chinese courts.81 From 2007 to 2009, the number
of victories in trademark infringement and counterfeiting cases doubled each year.82
Additionally, many major luxury brand owners have had significant success in
litigating large, highly publicized trademark infringement/counterfeiting cases in
Chinese courts.83 Several of these cases specifically provide insight as to why many
foreign companies have become more reliant on the judiciary to correct injustices and
systemic inadequacies within the Chinese trademark system.84
A. Rolex v. CINET Information Corp.
In September 2002, the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court85 made its
first decision in an Internet domain name infringement case and found in favor of the
famous brand “Rolex.”86 Montres Rolex (“Rolex”) obtained Chinese trademark

81
82

Id.
Id. (illustrating the percentage of litigation wins in Chinese courts from 2006–2009).
CIELA Summary Report Trend by Year: Outcome
Year
Win
2009
53%
2008
25%
2007
11%
2006
7%

83 See Swiss Montres Rolex S.A. (Montres Rolex) v. Beijing CINET Information Co., Beijing
Intermediate People’s Court, September 20, 2002, English translation available at http://www.ccpitpatent.com.cn/News/2001110701.htm (indicating that Chinese courts were trending towards
applying the standards laid out in TRIPS and Chinese trademark law); Zhang Yong, Starbucks Sues
DAILY,
Feb.
16,
2004,
Over
Trademark
Infringement,
CHINA
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/16/content_306362.htm
(marking
the
first
decision made by a local Chinese court on infringement of a well-known mark under revised
trademark law); CHINA PATENT AGENT (H.K.) LTD., 100 HIGH-PROFILE CASES IN CHINA (CASE
BRIEFS) 295–98 (Wang et. al eds. 2009) (illustrating one of the first instances that Chinese courts
were willing to liberally construe the law to protect the interests of foreign major brand owners);
Sichuan Softbill Auction Ltd. v. Sotheby’s Auction, No. 324 (Beijing Higher People’s Ct., Aug., 2008),
http://www.flssw.com/caipanwenshu/info/1837429/).
84 Hill, supra note 73, at 296.
85 Zhai Jianxiong, Judicial Information of the People's Republic of China:
A Survey,
LLRX.COM (Sept. 30, 2002), http://www.llrx.com/features/chinajudicial.htm (noting that China's
judicial system consists of four levels: the Basic People's Court, the Intermediate People's Court, the
Higher People's Court, and the Supreme People's Court). As is the case in the United States, the
Supreme People's Court is the highest court in China, handling not only appeals, but also issuing
judicial interpretations that are legally binding upon lower courts. Id. Each province and major city
in China has a Higher People's Court, and each major city has one or two Intermediate People’s
Courts. Basic People’s Courts exist at the level of each county in every major city. Id. China has a
“two-instance” judicial system, which means that the decisions of the court of first instance can be
appealed to the court at the next level, which is usually the final decision. Id.
86 Swiss Montres Rolex S.A. (Montres Rolex) v. Beijing CINET Information Co, Ltd., Beijing
Intermediate People’s Court, September 20, 2002, English translation available at http://www.ccpitpatent.com.cn/News/2001110701.htm.
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registrations of “Rolex,” 劳力士 (Rolex in Chinese), and Rolex’s crown symbol in
They subsequently launched campaigns to promote their products.88
1992.87
However, when they later attempted to obtain registration in the domain name field,
Rolex was unable to do so because of a preemptive registration by CINET of
rolex.com/cn.89
The court forced Beijing’s CINET Information Corporation to cancel its
registration of rolex.com/cn and compensate Montres Rolex in the amount of 10,000
RMB (roughly $1,300 U.S. Dollars).90 It held that the “Rolex” trademark had
achieved a high reputation in China and CINET’s act was “very likely to cause
confusion to the public between the holder of the domain name rolex.com/cn and the
actual owner of the registered mark.”91 As such, allowing CINET to keep the domain
name would violate the basic principles of honesty, credit and would constitute unfair
competition.92 The decision of the Beijing Intermediate Court in this case acts as a
positive sign that courts are finally diligently applying the standards laid out in the
TRIPS Agreement and Chinese Trademark law93 and would continue to do so in
subsequent cases.94
B. Starbucks Co. and Shanghai Unified Coffee, Ltd. v. Shanghai Xingbake Coffee, Ltd.
In the highly publicized case, Starbucks Co. and Shanghai Unified Coffee, Ltd. v.
Shanghai Xingbake Coffee, Ltd., Chinese courts recognized, for the first time, the use
of a phonetically similar mark to another’s trademark on a similar product or service
as grounds for trademark infringement.95 Starbucks alleged this type of trademark
infringement in their suit against a Shanghai coffeehouse in December 2003.96 The
two coffeehouses share the same three characters: 1) xing; 2) ba; and 3) ke, in
Chinese pinyin.97
Starbucks launched its chain of coffee houses in Taiwan in 1998 and
subsequently authorized a Taiwanese company, The President Group, to operate the
business in China.98 The business registered “XINGBAKE” as their Chinese name,
and later opened coffeehouses using that name in Taiwan and Hong Kong.99 In May
2000, Starbucks and The President Group jointly established the Shanghai President
Starbucks Shareholding Company and attempted to register the “XINGBAKE” mark
with local authorities.100 However, their attempt to register the mark failed because
Id.
Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Cahan, supra note 44, at 236.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Wong, supra note 75, at 953.
96 Id.
97 See Yong, supra note 83 (clarifying that in Chinese “xing” means “star” and “ba-ke”
phonetically sounds like “bucks”).
98 Wong, supra note 75, at 953.
99 Id.
100 Id.
87
88

[12:262 2012] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

274

Shanghai Xingbake registered the enterprise name in March 2000.101 Although
Starbucks had not formally entered the Shanghai market at that time, “Xingbake”
had been used in Taiwan as an “alternate” name for Starbucks since 1998.102
After several unsuccessful attempts to reach an out of court settlement and
receiving nominal relief from administrative protection, Starbucks filed suit against
Shanghai Xingbake.103 Citing potential consumer confusion, trademark infringement
and bad faith, Starbucks demanded that Shanghai Xingbake cease and desist using
the “Xingbake” trademark as well as its logo, which was similar in coloring and
design to Starbucks’ own.104 On these claims, Starbucks sought damages of 500,000
yuan (U.S. $62,500), the maximum amount of damages allowable under the 2001
Revision of the P.R.C. Trademark law.105 After months of delay, the court “handed
down a decision finding that Shanghai Xingbake had engaged in unfair competition”
and forced Shanghai Xingbake to stop using “xingbake” and to pay 500,000
RMB/yuan to Starbucks.106
This decision is particularly important because it was the first decision made by
a local court on infringement of a well-known mark under the revised trademark
law.107 A trademark is of greater importance “than a trade or company name under
Chinese law.”108 Major brand owners like Starbucks have invested “heavily into
building their brands.”109 When infringement of these famous marks occurs, the
integrity of the brand is at stake.110 This decision sends a positive message to foreign
companies and major brand owners attempting to navigate the murky waters of the
Chinese market. Many foreign corporations openly “criticized Chinese courts for their
favoritism of the local party in infringement actions, but this decision appears to
suggest that the tides may be turning.”111 Now the domestic corporation has its turn
at alleging mistreatment by the People’s court.112 As such, this victory may appear to

Id. at 254–55.
Yong, supra note 83.
103 Legal Battle Brews Between Starbucks and Chinese Coffee Shop, EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE
WIRE, Aug. 6, 2003, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_028624075234_ITM (noting that Shanghai Xingbake had plans to open an additional thirty to fifty
franchise outlets in downtown Shanghai); see also Toh Han Shih, Starbucks Sues in Shanghai Cafe
CHINA
MORNING
POST,
Jan.
31,
2004,
Sign
Spat,
SOUTH
http://www.scmp.com/article/442816/starbucks-sues-shanghai-cafe-sign-spat
(explaining
that
Shanghai Xingbake failed to object the order from the Shanghai AIC, requesting that they remove
any signs, logos, and names similar to Starbucks).
104 Shih, supra note 103.
105 Wong, supra note 75, at 955.
106 Yin Ping, Judge Rules for Starbucks in Copyright Violation Case, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 2,
2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/02/content_508672.htm (stating that the
court imposed liability on the premise that Shanghai Xingbake engaged in unfair competition by
using the Chinese translation of Starbucks in its company name and by using a similar design logo
for its cafes).
107 Wong, supra note 75, at 956.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 954–55.
110 Shih, supra note 103.
111 Wong, supra note 75, at 958.
112 Amy Gu, Coffee Shop Appeals on Starbucks Trademark, THE STANDARD, Jan. 19, 2006,
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_cat=2&art_id=10237&sid=6291676&con_type=
1&d_str=20060119&fc=7 (stating that Shanghai Xingbake’s attorney argued that “the court was
101
102
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be strong sign that Chinese courts are treating foreign and domestic parties alike
after years of differential treatment.
C. Beijing Xiushui Street Garments Market Co., Ltd. v. French Chanel, et al
In the pivotal case Beijing Xiushui Street Garments Market Co., Ltd. v. French
Chanel, et al. al,113 Chanel had acquired trademark rights to the work mark and
design marks of CHANEL in 2001.114 In May 2005, Chanel was alerted that
counterfeit products were being sold in the Xiushui Street Apparel Market (“Xiushui
Market”).115 Chanel proceeded to buy a counterfeit bag with a CHANEL logo in a
shop at the mall with notarization.116 It proceeded to follow up with cease and desist
letters informing the mall of the infringing activities and demanded that those
activities immediately stop.117 The mall, along with the directly infringing vendor,
refused and Chanel subsequently filed suit in the Second Intermediate People’s
Court of Beijing.118
In affirming the first instance decision for Chanel,119 “the Higher People’s Court
of Beijing demonstrated its willingness to apply the doctrine of contributory
trademark infringement in favor of the trademark owner.”120 The 2001 Revision of
the Trademark Law does not explicitly address contributory liability. The Higher
People’s Court “invented” the doctrine by liberally construing Article 130 of the
General Principles of Civil Law and Articles 50 and 52 of the 2001 Revised
Trademark Law.121 This creative approach to interpreting the law promoted the
way too nice to the American company” and should have treated the companies, regardless of their
nationalities, the same way).
113 See generally CHINA PATENT AGENT (H.K.) LTD., 100 HIGH-PROFILE CASES IN CHINA (CASE
BRIEFS) 295–98 (Wang et. al eds. 2009) [hereinafter CHINA PATENT AGENT (H.K.) LTD] (illustrating
that Chanel jointly filed suit along with four other major luxury brand owners: Gucci, Prada,
Burberry and Chanel).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 296.
116 Id.
117 Id. (stating that Chanel filed suit in September in Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court
after making several notarized purchases of handbags bearing counterfeit Chanel marks).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 298 (holding that Silk Street was held jointly and severally liable for the consequence
of Huang Shangwang’s infringement based on Article 50(2) of the Trademark Law Implementing
Regulations and Article 130 of the General Civil Principles, which jointly establish secondary
liability for trademark infringement for landlords that intentionally facilitate the infringement of
another’s exclusive right to use a trademark such as storage, transportation, or concealment).
120 Timothy Lau et al., Protecting Trademark Rights in China Through Litigation, 47 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 441, 449 (2011).
121 The two areas of Chinese law which hold individuals civilly liable for secondary trademark
infringement are Article 130 of the General Principles of the Civil Law (“Article 130”) and Articles 50
and 52 of the Regulation for the Implementation of the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of
China (“Article 50”). Article 130 states that, “[i]f more than two people jointly conduct infringing
activities which cause damages to others,” they should be held jointly liable for the damage. This
provision generally refers to infringement of any kind, including but not limited to, copyright
infringement, patent infringement and trademark infringement. See CHINA PATENT AGENT (H.K)
LTD., supra note 113, at 297 (holding that Chinese courts have applied provisions of Article 130 with
Articles 50 and 52 to hold secondary infringers, landlords, liable for trademark infringement).
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impression that Chinese courts were willing to liberally construe the law to protect
the interests of major foreign brand owners.122 Additionally, it put forth the
impression that Chinese courts are actually protecting the IPR interests of major
brand owners.123
D. Sotheby’s Auction House v. Sichuan Softbill
In the case between Sotheby’s Auction House and Softbill, Chinese courts
expanded the scope of trademark protection to a degree which extends past that of
even the United States. Sotheby’s is one of the two premier auction houses in the
world.124 It engages in art auctions, private sales and other art-related financing
activities.125 It established a Hong Kong Branch in 1974 to develop its business in
the Asian market, and started a series of promotional activities in mainland China in
1988 using its original English “SOTHEBY’S” as well as its Chinese counterpart.126
Openly trying to take advantage of Sotheby’s reputation, a local company called
Sichuan Softbill adopted similar sounding English words and the same Chinese
characters for its name.127 Softbill used these words and characters in their
publicity, literature, and promotional materials.128
The court’s holding in this case was particularly notable because it
“acknowledged that Sotheby’s never put, nor can ever put its marks to use for
commercial auctions in China because of the legal prohibitions”129 set forth in the
Auction Law and the Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics.130 The court
nonetheless decided that the mark was entitled to protection because Sotheby’s has
“put to de facto use” the Sotheby’s mark in Chinese characters through charity and

According to Article 50, “[a]ny individual that intentionally provides facilitating conditions such as
storage, transportation, shipping or concealment, to trademark infringers, may be held liable for
trademark infringement under the PRC Trademark Law.” Trademark Law P.R.C. 2001, supra note
58. The legal consequence of this provision is that landlords may jointly bear liability with the
direct infringer if they knowingly provide him with storage, transportation or any sort of facilitation.
Lau et al., supra note 120, at 449. Additionally, a landlord may be liable for trademark
infringement if their conduct is perceived “to cause, in other respects, prejudice to the exclusive right
of another person to use a registered trademark.” Trademark Law P.R.C. 2001, supra note 58, art.
50. However, instead of holding a landlord individually liable for infringement, the court will likely
hold the direct infringer jointly and severally liable under Article 130. Civil Law of the People’s
Republic of China, art. 130.
122 Lau et al., supra note 120, at 449.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 444.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 444–45.
128 Chinese Softbill Corporation, HKSSB.COM, http://www.hkssb.com/ (last visited October 12,
2011).
129 Lau et al., supra note 120, at 445.
130 Auction Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Jul. 5, 1996, amended Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004); see also Law of
People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Cultural Relics (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 19, 1982, amended Dec. 29, 2007, effective Dec. 29, 2007).
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promotional events, sufficient for the “relevant public to know that it is a provider of
auction services.”131
The magnitude of protection shown to trademark rights shown by the Chinese
court here is not available in the United States.132 In the United States it is
unthinkable for an American court “to extend protection to a mark in a service area
where there is no indication or even possibility of future use.”133 It is clear why
foreign brands would consider using litigation as part of their trademark
enforcement strategy in China when the scope of protection is broader than in the
United States.
E. Overall Effectiveness of Civil Litigation Victories on Counterfeiting and Trademark
Infringement in China
Since 2001, China has made significant strides in the laws governing
trademarks and has trended toward positive treatment of international brand
owners in its civil courts.134 These efforts have convinced international brand owners
that litigation is an effective mechanism135 of enforcing trademarks136 by way of the
Chinese judiciary.137 However, this type of reliance by international brand owners
trying to do business in China is seriously misguided. Judicial enforcement is still
plagued by a plethora of issues, including lack of judicial independence, difficulty in
enforcing judgments, and inadequacy of penalties.138 These issues raise serious
concerns for international brand owners attempting to protect their trademarks
because enforcement is the “key to protection of IPR in China.”139 As such, attempts
by international brand owners to use litigation and the Chinese court system to
enforce their marks and prevent counterfeiting is still unreliable as a first resort
trademark protection and enforcement strategy.140
Lack of judicial independence of Chinese courts is one of the factors which
prevents litigation from being a successful enforcement mechanism of international
131 Lau et al., supra note 120, at 445; see also
Sichuan Softbill Auction Ltd. v. Sotheby’s
Auction,
No.
324
(Beijing
Higher
People’s
Ct.,
Aug.,
2008),
http://www.flssw.com/caipanwenshu/info/1837429/.
132 Lau et al., supra note 120, at 445.
133 Id.
134 Wong, supra note 75, at 972.
135 Joseph Simone, In the Courts: Holding the Landlord Liable—New Tools for the Counterfeit
MAG.
(Nov.
2007),
Crackdown
in
China,
WIPO
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2007/06/article_0006.html.
136 Infringement of trademarks and counterfeiting still occurs at an alarming rate in China
despite these victories for major luxury brand owners like Rolex, Louis Vuitton and Starbucks. See
Eric Poon, Silk Market Liability Ruling Expected in China, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.(September 15,
2011), http://www.managingip.com/Article/2791898/Silk-Market-liability-ruling-expected-inChina.html (“Despite the positive outcomes for major luxury brand owners, litigation has proved to
have little effect on counterfeiting in China.”).
137 Although this comment is specifically on trademark protection and enforcement, this
statement is also relevant to other forms of IPR, including patents, copyrights, and trade secrets.
138 Wong, supra note 75, at 969.
139 Amanda S. Reid, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries: China
as a Case Study, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 63, 72 (2003).
140 Id.
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trademarks in China.141 Although the Constitution grants the People’s Court “the
power of independent adjudication,”142 the Court “must still adhere to the CCP’s
‘unified leadership’, which can lead to shaping of an outcome by a party.”143 The
Court is still dependent on the People’s Congress for its annual budget and
appointments to the judiciary,144 which acts as effective external pressure on Chinese
judges.145 Unlike federal judges in the United States, Chinese judges do not have
tenure and can face removal from their position.146 Therefore, fear of “removal can
result in judges unreasonably denying motions for transfer of forum, delivering
verdicts favorable to local parties or refusing to respect the former judgments by
other courts.”147 Moreover, individual decisions can be reviewed by committees that
are authorized by the People’s Congress to direct the “proper verdict” or grant
appeals to higher courts.148 Members of these committees are often loyalists to the
Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”)149 or individuals with connections to local
businesses, which is clearly problematic for international brand owners.150 Although
the WTO’s power to review decisions by Chinese courts has reduced political
influence and judicial corruption, it has limited time and resources to dedicate to
such review, and a significant amount of corruption goes unnoticed at the local
level.151
At the local level, difficulties in enforcing judgments run rampant.152 Currently,
there is no formal communication system between local governments.153
Additionally, local People’s Congresses promulgate laws and regulations to
implement the laws handed down by the national legislature, which fail to comply
with the regulations of the national government.154 This makes it difficult for judges

Id. at 93-94.
Wong, supra note 75, at 970; FENG, supra note 47, at 358; Trademark Law P.R.C. 2001,
supra note 58, art. 52(2).
143 FENG, supra note 47, at 25–26.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Julia Cheng, China’s Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires an Internal
Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1941, 1989 (1997).
147 Id. at 1992–93.
148 Evans, supra note 79, at 592.
149 Paul B. Birden Jr., Trademark Protection in China: Trends and Directions, 17 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 431, 477 (1996) ( “The problematic rise in official bribery and corruption following
China’s shift from a centrally-planned to a market economy has contributed to the rise in trademark
infringement.”) Many Chinese infringers are protected by Chinese officials and local business
owners and are subsequently “beyond the Intellectual Property Courts’ ability to prosecute.”
Gregory S. Kolton, Copyright Law and the People’s Courts in the People’s Republic of China: A
Review and Critique of China’s Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 415, 449
(1996).
150 Birden, supra note 149, at 477.
151 Id.
152 Wong, supra note 75, at 971.
153 Id. This makes it quite easy for an infringer to simply pick up shop and move to a different
locale after a judgment has been made against him. Id. The infringer’s new locale would have no
way of knowing of his previous infringing conduct and therefore, could not enforce the judgment of
the court against him. Id. As such, the infringer would theoretically be free to start up a new
infringing enterprise in his new locale. Id.
154 Zhou, supra note 75, at 435.
141
142
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to find and implement the applicable laws.155 Moreover, local courts156, unlike the
National People’s Congress and the Supreme People’s Court, do not publish their
laws and opinions in official gazettes.157 This often results in “an inconsistent
application of laws among the different localities, adding an additional challenge for
trademark protection” and enforcement.158
Not only have Chinese courts failed to enforce judgments against infringers,
penalties and damages assessed against infringers159 by Chinese courts have been so
low that they fail act as a deterrent for infringers.160 These damage amounts,
averaging $15,000 per suit, only compensate IPR owners for a small proportion of
their losses under Chinese law.161 The amounts are so low that infringers are able to
earn an adequate profit despite having to pay these penalties and can continue to
infringe.162 Fines, therefore, represent only a tiny fraction of the estimated sales
revenue lost to IPR holders.163 If infringers are not adequately deterred from
infringing, there is insufficient protection for innovators and decreased incentives to
invest in research and development.164 The low damage amounts assessed by
Chinese courts have compromised the effectiveness of the IPR system in China.165
These cases, Rolex, Starbucks, Chanel et al., and Sotheby’s, mark important
milestones in the continuum of Chinese IP development. They demonstrate the
Id.; Wong, supra note 75, at 971.
Zhou, supra note 75, at 434. Localities in China are organized by province. Id. There are
twenty-two provinces in China, with multiple courts in each that are responsible for writing down,
and compiling their court decisions into a gazette. Id.
157 Wong, supra note 75, at 970.
158 Id.
159 Trademark Law P.R.C. 2001, supra note 58, art. 52. Damages for trademark infringement
and counterfeiting are assessed under several sections of the 2001 Trademark Law. Under Article
56, the amount of damages is calculated according to
155
156

the profit that the infringer has earned because of the infringement in the period
of the infringement or the injury that the infringee has suffered from the
infringement in the period of the infringement, including the appropriate
expenses of the infringee for stopping the infringement.
Trademark Law P.R.C. 2001. When it is difficult to determine the profit that the
infringer has earned, the People’s Court can impose an amount of damages of no
more than 500,000 RMB (which is about $60,000 U.S. Dollars).
Id.

Zhou, supra note 75, at 433–34.
2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 25, at 19 (concluding that inadequate IPR
enforcement is a key factor contributing to these shortcomings, with high criminal thresholds, as
well as difficulties in initiating or transferring cases for criminal prosecution resulting in limited
deterrence"); see also KRISTINA SEPETYS & ALAN COX, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROTECTION IN CHINA: TRENDS IN LITIGATION AND ECONOMIC DAMAGES 7 (Nat’l Econ. Research
Assocs. ed., 2009) (stating that the plaintiff has the option of choosing how damages are assessed.).
162 SEPETYS & COX, supra note 161, at 8 (finding that more than 90 percent of all IPR damages
awarded in China are under $100,000 U.S. Dollars and that the median damage award across all
IPR cases in 2006–2007 was approximately $15,000).
163 See generally U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Information Programs,
"Trade Official Urges China to Punish IPR Violators Forcefully," IIP DIGITAL (illustrating that the
costs associated with counterfeiting are difficult to calculate).
164 SEPETYS & COX, supra note 161, at 3.
165 Id. at 2.
160
161

[12:262 2012] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

280

progress the Chinese judiciary has made in protecting trademarks from imminent
infringement and counterfeiting. Despite these successes and China’s compliance
with TRIPS and other international treaties166 civil litigation still fails to have a
lasting impact on trademark protection and enforcement in China.167 Victories in
litigation do not directly translate to effective enforcement and protection of
trademarks. So what are international companies and brand owners to do?
III. PROPOSAL
The successes of major international brand owners like Rolex and Louis Vuitton,
in Chinese courts, have created the impression that litigation is a viable and effective
first step in protecting and enforcing trademarks in China. However, as previously
illustrated, judicial enforcement of trademark rights in China is fraught with tension
and fails to actually enforce trademark rights post-adjudication. As such, litigation
should always be a last step in the enforcement of trademark and other intellectual
property rights. This section proposes alternative and preventative strategies which
may prove useful for international brand owners, and the lawyers who represent
them, in protecting their trademarks from infringement and from counterfeiting in
China. First and foremost, international brand owners should begin with brand
management and make trademark protection and enforcement part of the overall
business plan. Second, they should engage and reach out to the Chinese government
on both local and national levels. Third, international brands need to think outside
the “litigation box.” Finally, if all else fails, they should utilize alternative dispute
resolution.
A. IPR Enforcement as a Business Plan
Many international brand owners view protecting their trademarks and
preventing counterfeiting as two separate endeavors. In actuality, they pertain to
the same thing: protecting the goodwill and value associated with their brand name
and products. International brand owners trying to conduct business in China often
spend immeasurable amounts of time and money on enforcing their trademarks and
preventing counterfeiting AFTER such infringement or counterfeiting has already
occurred.168 In order to effectively prevent this from happening, brand owners need
Wong, supra note 75, at 959.
Maya Alexandri, Good Brand, Bad Brand, DANWEI (Jan. 30, 2007, 10:42 PM),
http://www.danwei.org/intellectual_property/good_brand_bad_brand.php (stating that a coalition
composed of twenty-three brands formed to take advantage of the initial Silk Market decisions and
press the theory in other markets in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen via cooperation
with landlords, AIC, and other concerned government agencies). The coalition, after taking notice of
the lack of trademark enforcement at brick and mortar retail hubs, like Silk Street Market, filed
suits against twenty-two different stall owners and Silk Street landlords in 2008 and again in 2011.
Id. Again, it had favorable results for the brand owners. Id. Despite the seemingly endless stream
of suits, Silk Street Co. is still up and running strong. As such, it is clear that litigation alone is not
an effective means of trademark enforcement and anti-counterfeiting in China. Id.
168 J. Benjamin Bai & Guoping Da, Strategies for Trade Secrets Protection in China, 9 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 351, 364 (2011).
166
167
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to stop separating the concepts of counterfeiting and trademark infringement and
focus on IPR protection as a whole. Instead of trying to enforce their IPR at the
litigation stage, which is often time consuming and expensive, international brand
owners should focus on the preventative prevention of IPR infringement as a
business model through a companywide scheme of confidentiality and education.169
A first step international brand owners can take is to closely monitor
production. It is imperative that brand owners implement appropriate security
measures when producing goods that bear both their word and design marks.
Preventative security measures include limiting access to production facilities,
securing production materials after hours (like official brand logos), installing
security monitoring equipment and implementing procedures and protocols in the
event counterfeiting or trademark infringement should occur.170 If individuals or the
public cannot figure out exactly how a specific good is made, what materials are used
to make the good, or how to affix a proper mark to the good, it is much more difficult
for a counterfeit model or an article that infringes upon an international brand
owner’s trademark to “successfully” reach the marketplace.
Part of closely monitoring production is choosing the employees who will be
engaged with production and limiting the exposure of these employees to market
once they no longer work at the company. Therefore, brand owners must screen
potential employees, vendors, and partners and implement and enforce contracts not
to compete and confidentiality agreements.171 Theft of IP by employees and business
associates is common, especially in China.172 It is important to ask questions of
prospective employees to evaluate ethical and moral standards. It is within a brand
owner’s best interest to conduct due diligence on potential business associates. This
duty does not end with screening potential employees, and must be continued
through implementing contractual confidentiality measures like contracts not to
compete.173

169 Id.; see also Ryan P. Johnson, Steal This Note: Proactive Intellectual Property Protection in
the People’s Republic of China, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1005, 1025 (2006).
170 Bai & Da, supra note 168, at 366 (establishing that a company should take a multi-lateral
approach to corporate confidentiality).
171 Id. (explaining that protecting IPR successfully requires obtaining references and
background checks on all managers, key employees, and persons who will have regular access to any
confidential information).
172 Id.
173 Id. A successful confidentiality policy should:
(1) Require all key personnel who have knowledge of IPR to sign confidentiality
agreements. In addition, the company should have a formal policy regarding the
ownership of any intellectual property created by the employee during his
employment, such as assigning all IP rights, including trade secret rights, to the
company.
(2) Conduct regular training on the company's confidentiality policy.
(3) Verify that all employees have received a copy of the confidentiality policy in
their employee handbook and have signed a statement acknowledging that they
have read, understood and will comply with the policy…
(8) Conduct exit interviews of departing employees to ensure that they are not
taking to their new jobs any information that the company would not want to
disclose to a competitor.
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Additionally, the continued education and training of current employees on
issues in intellectual property plays an important role in the preventative protection
of IPR as a brand management strategy. It is foolish for any brand owner to assume
that any employee, American, foreign, new or old has a comprehensive knowledge of
intellectual property principles and laws. It is thus important for brand owners to
show all employees that intellectual property enforcement is important and is taken
seriously by the company through continued education and mandatory training
sessions However, leading by example is the best way. Employees will not take the
issue seriously if the brand owner or direct supervisor does not.
B. Working with the Chinese Government, Not Against It
Another proactive way for international brand owners to enforce their marks is
by putting the Chinese government on notice. One of the ways that this can be
achieved is through the registration of its trademarks with the Chinese
government.174 By registering a trademark with the government, brand owners have
legal standing for any potential infringement suit and put the government on notice
of the brand’s existence within their borders.175 Trademark registration is only a
small step in putting the government on notice however. It is absolutely essential
that government awareness of a mark be achieved in a positive way. This can be
done by working together with the local government to promote and market the
brand to government officials on a personal level.
Working together with a local government to promote the brand means creating
local incentives that would cause the local government to take interest in the brand.
A prime example of this is the McDonald’s brand176 in China.177 McDonald’s

Id.

(9) Terminate electronic access for departing employees immediately prior to
termination. In the alternative, closely monitor electronic access in accordance
with company computer policies
(10) To the extent possible, keep the key computers bearing confidential
information off the network.
(11) To the extent possible, limit unauthorized downloading and/or installation of
software that is not work-related.
(12) To the extent possible, but without invading personal privacy, monitor
employee web surfing and email communication both in and out of the company
computers.
(13) Ask contractors and employees to provide written undertakings not to
compete with your business after they leave…
(15) Build and maintain good relationships with the local police and Chinese
government agencies, such as the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce

174 Jin Chunqing & Wu Xiaopeng, Trademark Registration in China, GLOBALIZATION AND
LOCALIZATION
ASS’N,
http://www.galaglobal.org/en/resources/ArticleDB_TrademarkRegistrationinChina.pdf (establishing two central
principles guide China’s laws regarding the registration of trademarks: the registration rule and the
first to file rule).
175 Id.
176 Franchising
Industry
in
China,
FRANCHISE.ORG,
http://www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/Franchise_Industry/International_Development/franchising
%20in%20China.pdf (establishing the fact that McDonald’s operates through a joint venture in
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established economic joint ventures178 (“EJVs”) with both Chinese companies and
agricultural collectives when it began to expand into China in the early 1990s.179
EJVs between the United States and Chinese businesses and agricultural collectives
signified that a portion of McDonald’s profits would go to the government.180
Therefore, the government had an economically vested interest in the success of
McDonald’s in China and promoted the restaurant in many government sponsored
advertising campaigns. Soon, McDonald’s became synonymous with wealth and
exclusivity, becoming the second most popular fast food restaurant in the country.181
While the role the Chinese government played in McDonald’s was business focused,
this is not to say that it will not work in a similar manner for companies attempting
to enforce their marks in China.
C. Thinking Outside the “Litigation Box”
International brand owners should utilize the market as a way of enforcing their
IPR. Chinese consumers are beginning to discern purchase decisions even more than
their Western counterparts.182 Since joining the WTO in 2001, Chinese consumers
have become increasingly brand conscious and brand loyal.183 As such, marketing
campaigns “that accentuate the faults of pirated products” and encourage consumer
loyalty to the original product may be very effective in inducing consumers to stop
buying pirated products in China.184 Consumers “benefit from experiencing product
quality and IP-dependent businesses,” like Chanel and Starbucks, will see increased
profits.185
Convincing customers to buy authentic goods through anti-piracy
marketing campaigns would decrease the sales of pirated and counterfeit goods,
which in turn would lower infringers’ profits and possibly reducing the amount of
infringing and counterfeit materials available on the market.

China). McDonald’s set up a joint venture with a local company in Beijing when it entered the
Chinese capital in 1992. Id. Up to now McDonald’s has about 600 outlets in China, but none of them
is operating through direct franchising. Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. (defining a joint venture as a limited liability corporation in which both partners invest
in and manage operation through a Board of Directors).
179 Id.
180 Bai & Da, supra note 168, at 1035 (showing that entering into a contractual agreement
avoids looking directly to the Chinese courts or government to achieve protection).
181 Franchising
Industry
in
China,
FRANCHISE.ORG,
http://www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/Franchise_Industry/International_Development/franchising
%20in%20China.pdf (establishing the fact that McDonald’s operates through a joint venture in
China).
182 TIM AMBLER ET AL., DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 135 (3d ed. 2000).
183 Id.
184 Johnson, supra note 169, at 1031.
185 Id.
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D. Alternative Dispute Resolution: It’s not called Alternative for Nothin’
Despite of the flaws associated with the enforcement of intellectual property
rights and the shortcomings of the court for the PRC, alternative dispute resolution
is an effective technique that international brand owners have the option of turning
to. China, “like many Asian nations,” is adverse to litigation186 and only utilizes its
court system as a last resort.187 Under the Arbitration Law of the PRC,188 two
separate arbitration systems were established: one for domestic economic disputes
and one for foreign related economic disputes.189 The China International Economic
and Trade Arbitration Commission oversees arbitration in China190 and allows for
“streamlined arbitrations before multilingual arbitrators which may be conducted in
any official language upon which the parties agree.”191 This system is primarily used
for parties that have a contractual relationship with each other.192 If international
corporations in China put into practice the confidentiality contracts and contracts not
to compete, suggested in Part A of this section, alternative dispute resolution in
China may be a viable option for international brand owners looking to enforce their
marks.
CONCLUSION
China has been viewed by many as a country lacking a strong intellectual
property protection system. Previously, “some multinational companies assumed
that China did not protect IP and ignored the procurement of IP in China.”193
However, since entering the WTO in 2001, China has made significant strides
making IP protection and enforcement a priority. As evidenced by the 2001
Amendments to The Trademark Law to comply with TRIPS, the creation and
implementation of special IP courts, the many IP education options made available to
Chinese individuals through CIPTC, the development of SIPO and WIPO and most
recently, the victories won by major international brand owners in Chinese courts, a
new IP protection paradigm is emerging in China. As such, international companies
should now assume that China protects IP and begin to seriously invest in the

186 Jill Chiang Fung, Can Mickey Mouse Prevail in the Court of the Monkey King? Enforcing
Foreign Intellectual Property Rights in the People’s Republic of China, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 613, 634 (1996); See also David B. Dreyfus, Confucianism and Compact Discs: Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Its Role in the Protection of United States Intellectual Property Rights in
China, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 947, 970 (1998) (“Although judicial remedies exist in China
for intellectual property infringement cases, the government places an emphasis on administrative
and other non-adjudicative resolutions such as mediation and arbitration.”).
187 Dreyfus, supra note 186, at 970.
188 Kolton, supra note 149, at 423 (establishing that trademark owners—international brand
owners—can consent to arbitration or mediation for settling infringement suits).
189 Yuan Cheng, Legal Protection of Trade Secrets in the People’s Republic of China, 5 PAC. RIM
L. & POL’Y J. 261, 291 (1996).
190 Birden, supra note 149, at 482.
191 Dreyfus, supra note 186, at 970.
192 Cheng, supra note 189, at 291.
193 Bai & Da, supra note 168, at 1035.
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Chinese market. However, it does not mean that international brand owners and the
lawyers who represent them can step back and relax.
It is the attorney’s job to be the best advocate she can be for her client.
Sometimes, that means putting the litigation bat down and keeping her eye on her
client’s best interests. Although litigation has won pivotal victories for international
brand owners in Chinese courts, it is by no means the most effective or efficient
means to protect and enforce your client’s IPR in China. A more comprehensive and
preventative approach integrating culture, education, and confidentiality is needed.
If all the recommendations discussed in this comment are followed, an international
brand owner’s risk of infringement and counterfeiting should decrease and the
chance of enforcing its trademark rights in China should increase.

